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ABSTRACT: The “puzzle” of emotional plasticity concerns making sense of two conflicting 
bodies of evidence: evidence that emotions often appear modular in key respects, and 
evidence that our emotions also often appear to transcend this modularity. In this paper, I 
argue a developmentalist approach to emotion, which builds on Karmiloff-Smith’s (1986, 
1992, 1994, 2015) work on cognitive development, can help us dissolve this puzzle.  
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  1. Introduction 
Most philosophers of emotion accept that our emotional responses are, more or less, plastic. That is, 
they can, to an extent, be shaped and reshaped by us and by our socio-cultural environments. But this 
runs counter to many empirically-driven theories of emotion which suppose that at least some of our 
emotional responses are the products of special emotion-generating systems in the brain or ‘modules’. 
The problem, in brief, is that traditional ways of understanding modularity threaten to make emotional 
plasticity into a philosophical puzzle because modules, by definition, are thought to be incapable of 
undergoing learning. In this paper, I draw on recent insights from developmental psychology, 
especially Karmiloff-Smith’s (1986, 1992, 1994, 2015) work on cognitive development, to dissolve 
this puzzle. I argue both the appearance of emotional modularity, as well as our ability to transcend 
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this modularity (i.e. exhibit emotional plasticity), can be explained by two distinct, yet 
complementary, developmental factors, viz. developmental modularity and cognitive flexibility. 
 The paper is structured as follows. First, I give a brief overview of the “puzzle” of emotional 
plasticity (Section 2). I then appeal to the notion of developmental modules to explain why emotions 
look modular (Section 3) and the notion of cognitive flexibility to explain why they can transcend 
this modularity (Section 4).  
 
  2. Background 
‘Emotional plasticity’ is a term of art, a recent one at that.1 The term may be new, but the idea 
certainly isn’t it. The term, I take it, is a nod to both neural plasticity and phenotype plasticity; the 
former being the ability of our brains to form new neural connections throughout our lives, and the 
latter capturing the ability of an organism to alter its phenotype in response to its environment. 
Emotional plasticity is similar, but also more familiar. In the broadest sense of the term, emotional 
plasticity is the capacity of our emotions to undergo change, say in response to our socio-cultural 
setting. For example, Tappolet observes, “Quite generally, emotional systems manifest an important 
degree of plasticity, in the sense that they are largely shaped, and can also be reshaped, by their socio-
cultural environments” (2016, p. 37). Likewise, our emotions can also be changed, to an extent, by 
us, e.g. a phobic might eliminate, if not minimize, their fear by undergoing therapy. 
 This broad characterization of emotional plasticity subsumes several related, though 
importantly distinct, phenomena. For instance, it captures both phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
changes: respectively, the evolutionary history of emotions in our species, and developmental 
 
1 See Schafe and LeDoux (2002), Faucher and Tappolet (2008a), Saarni (2010), Kotsou et. al. (2011), 
and Tappolet (2016). 
 
  3 
changes in an individual’s emotional responses during their lifespan. Within the domain of ontogeny, 
it captures both intrapersonal and interpersonal emotional changes, i.e. changes in an individual’s 
emotional development vs. differences in development across individuals.  Moreover, honing in on 
intrapersonal plasticity, it captures both the ability of an individual to regulate their occurrent 
emotions (i.e. the emotions they experience at a given occasion), as well their ability to influence 
their emotional dispositions over time. It is this latter ability, i.e. our ability to change our emotional 
dispositions, which has received most attention in the philosophy of emotion, and thus forms the topic 
of this paper. 
 There are at least two reasons which explain this focus. The first concerns its relevance for 
moral philosophy. There are several different ways issues about emotional plasticity intersect with 
moral theorizing, perhaps the simplest being that plasticity has implications for how we evaluate 
agents. It is worth pointing out that both forms of intrapersonal emotional plasticity play a role here. 
Consider someone with an angry temperament who is disposed towards acts of aggression when their 
anger gets too intense. For any specific act of aggression brought on by an episode of anger, the agent 
can only be deemed morally blameworthy if they can exert some control over this episode of anger. 
So the plasticity of occurrent emotions is relevant for how we evaluate the culpability of agents with 
respect to individual acts. But there is a larger issue at hand. If the agent is able to regulate the intensity 
of their anger on one occasion, this doesn’t mean that they have successfully changed their 
temperament. For lasting change, we want them to change not just a few specific instances of anger, 
but their long-term dispositions for anger as well. Moreover, we can judge the agent to be morally 
praiseworthy if they undergo such change and blameworthy if they don’t. Both moral praise and 
moral blame is predicated, then, on our being able to change not just our occurrent emotions, but also 
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our emotional dispositions. Moreover, when it comes to our emotions, arguably, it is change in our 
emotional dispositions which is really the all-important end goal for us as moral agents.2 
 Second, there is a widely held assumption in the philosophy of emotion that emotional 
dispositions are actually easier to change than certain kinds of occurrent emotional episodes. This 
feature of emotional plasticity is best exemplified by recalcitrant emotions. Recalcitrant emotions are 
emotions that are in tension with your considered judgments. For example, you fear Fido, your 
neighbor’s docile dog which you judge to be harmless.3 Recalcitrant emotions are supposed to be a 
common feature of our emotional lives. You are jealous when you partner talks to an attractive friend 
even when you know their interactions are perfectly harmless. You feel anxious and a bit fearful when 
you have to meet your dean, even when you know this meeting isn’t about them chastising you for 
anything. Recalcitrant emotions are said to be irrational, and explaining why this is so is taken to be 
a challenge for a theory of emotion.4 Tappolet (2012, 2016) assumes an ‘ought implies can’ principle 
when it comes to our emotions, and argues that recalcitrant emotions are irrational because something 
can be done about them, i.e. we may seek to revise our emotional responses. How? The recalcitrant, 
mulish, nature of recalcitrant emotions speaks to the difficulty in controlling them. Nevertheless, 
Tappolet thinks we can exert some level of control over even these sorts of emotions over time. That 
is, we can hope to change our emotional dispositions. For example, someone with serious issues about 
jealousy in their romantic relationships might seek therapy to minimize such boughts of jealousy. 
 
2 A more detailed description of the various connections between emotional plasticity and moral 
philosophy can be found in Faucher and Tappolet (2008a). 
3 See Greenspan (1981), D’Arms and Jacobson (2003), Benbaji (2013) and Grzankowski (2016). 
4 E.g. see Greenspan (1988), Helm (2001), Brady (2009) and Majeed (2020). 
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Tappolet’s explanation of the irrationality shrouding recalcitrant emotions has proved controversial, 
but what hasn’t is her claim that we can change our emotional dispositions over time.5 
 This sense of the ways we can and can’t change our emotions speaks to the very heart of  
what’s supposed to be puzzling about emotional plasticity. On the one hand, emotions often don’t 
seem to be the kinds of things we can influence. For example, you are devastated after a breakup, and 
it would be quite handy if you could stop feeling so incredibly sad, but you just can’t help it. The 
occurrence of recalcitrant emotions is another way of bringing out this point. But there is a crucial 
difference. Recalcitrant emotions are witness to the fact that, sometimes, emotions don’t just appear 
out of our control, they don’t seem to succumb to reason at all; they don’t seem to be influenced by 
your thoughts, judgments, etc. This feature of our recalcitrant emotions is evidence for the modularity 
of emotion.6 That is, recalcitrant emotions manifest several traits which characterize Fodor’s (1983) 
conception of modularity. They are quick and automatic. Sometimes they appear domain-specific, 
i.e. they are triggered by certain stimuli but not others. (Recall fearing Fido). But most crucially, 
recalcitrant emotions manifest what Fodor took be the essence of modularity, viz. information 
encapsulation. A cognitive system is informationally encapsulated, roughly, if the functions it 
computes are insensitive to what is going on elsewhere in the mind. Recalcitrant emotions appear 
informationally encapsulated in the sense that they are insensitive to what is going on in higher 
cognitive systems, e.g. those to do with judgment.  
 To recap, recalcitrant emotions give us reason to think that (some) emotions are modular in 
key respects. However, on the other hand, such emotions also appear to break free from the constrains 
of typical modular systems in that, as we have seen, we seem to be able to change them over time. 
 
5 See Döring (2014) and Majeed (2020). 
6 Frijda (1986), Griffiths (1990, 1997), Charland (1995), Goldie (2000), Prinz (2004, 2008), Faucher 
and Tappolet (2008b), Jones (2008), and Tappolet (2016). 
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Perceptual modalities, which were Fodor’s prime examples of modular systems, don’t act in this 
way.7 Optical illusions, for instance, continue to persist no matter how much, and for how long, we 
tell ourselves that what we are seeing is untrue. Emotions don’t seem to be modular in this sense. We 
can gradually change our emotional dispositions, at least some of the time. The “puzzle” of emotional 
plasticity is how we are to account for these two conflicting bodies of evidence: evidence that our 
emotions often appear modular in key respects, and evidence that our emotions also often appear to 
transcend this modularity.8 
It is plausible that some of the “puzzle” stems from a lack of terminological precision. In 
particular, they arise on account of the different ways the term ‘emotion’ is employed in various sub-
areas that discuss emotional modularity and emotional plasticity. For example, recalcitrant emotions 
typically refer to emotions triggered in response to specific situations, when dogs are near, when you 
see your partner flirting with someone etc., whereas discussions around changing your temperament 
in ethics focus on emotion types, e.g. fear, jealously, and so on. Some of the tension between the 
modular appearance of the former and the plastic nature of the latter could, therefore, be resolved by 
being clearer on what we mean by ‘emotion’. For instance, it might be that you never get rid of your 
fear of dogs, but you might, over time, become a less fearful person.  
Terminological precision, however, won’t dissolve the puzzle completely. In fact, it arguably 
won’t speak to the most puzzling aspect of our puzzle, i.e. why the very same kinds of emotional 
responses can appear both modular and plastic. As far as I can tell, it is this puzzle that is found in 
 
7 The plasticity of perception is actually somewhat contentious, but there tends to be acknowledgment 
within the philosophy of emotion that perception is a lot less plastic than emotion, e.g. see Tappolet 
(2012, p. 221) and Döring (2014, p. 127). 
8 Note: the tension here is sometimes described as a paradox, which is not, technically speaking, 
correct. So here I use the weaker notion of a puzzle. 
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the literature on recalcitrant emotions. Consider someone who has an irrational fear of dogs. Such a 
person might genuinely believe that their neighbor’s toothless dog is harmless and yet still have a 
fear response when it comes near. If Tappolet is right, we judge that person as being irrational because 
something can be done about their fear. In particular, while they might not be able to influence the 
fear they experience at that very moment, they might, over time, learn to eliminate, if not minimize, 
their disposition to fear dogs, including the one owned by their neighbor. The very same kind of 
emotional response, i.e. being afraid of your neighbor’s dog, then, can on the one hand appear 
modular and on the other appear plastic.  
 I should be clear from the onset that I don’t think this is a genuine puzzle. For there to be a 
genuine puzzle, it needs to be the case that the very same emotional phenomenon, e.g. the very same 
occurrence of fearing Fido, appears both modular and plastic. This is clearly not the case. 
Nevertheless, there is something puzzling about the way certain occurrent emotional responses can 
appear modular whilst our dispositions to have them can appear plastic. At a first pass, this “puzzle” 
stems from supposing that at least some emotions are the outcomes of Fodorian modules. An obvious 
response, then, is to eschew all talk of modularity. However, simply forgoing all talk of modularity 
isn’t the quick fix it promises to be either, as we need to explain the appearance of modularity, i.e. 
why emotions look like they are sometimes triggered by modular systems.9 One option is to rethink 
 
9 It is for this reason that constructionist accounts of emotion, e.g. Russell (1991, 2003) and Barrett 
(2013, 2017), don’t (presently) solve our puzzle. While they reject emotional modularity and allow 
for emotional plasticity, they don’t offer an explanation for why some emotions look modular. The 
same worry applies to other psychological theories of emotion development which eschew any talk 
of modularity, e.g. see Pérez-Edgar et al. (2019) for a review. As I see things, my solution to the 
puzzle should be congenial to such accounts. Barrett (2017), for instance, could incorporate 
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the traditional notion of modularity. There are already ways of rethinking emotional modularity that 
sets us on the right track. But so far, such moves have been preliminary. Moreover, I don’t think 
rethinking the notion of modularity alone suffices to resolve the appearance of a puzzle. 
 Consider the following by way of example. As we have seen, an important way a system can 
be modular on the Fodorian conception is if it is informationally encapsulated. Informationally 
encapsulated systems, however, are thought to be incapable of undergoing any learning.10 This in 
turn makes emotional plasticity, i.e. how emotions can be shaped and reshaped by us and by our 
socio-cultural environments, puzzling. But we can observe that there are really two ways a system 
can be informationally encapsulated. It can be encapsulated synchronically or diachronically (Majeed 
2019).11 A system which is encapsulated diachronically is neither influenced by what is currently 
going on elsewhere in the mind nor by what goes on elsewhere at any stage of development. By 
contrast, a system that is (just) synchronically encapsulated is insensitive to what is currently going 
on elsewhere in the mind, but it may be subject to diachronic updating, i.e. its functions might be 
influenced by what is going on in other systems, gradually, over the course of development. Crucially, 
this rethinking of modularity paves the way for a modular system which can be shaped and reshaped 
by us and by cultural and social factors. 
 For instance, consider how this plays out with regards to emotion. You might, say, have an 
irrational fear of Fido, but such irrational phobias are the sorts of things which people do sometimes 
overcome overtime. That emotions are plastic in this sense has been commented on by several 
 
developmental modules into her predictive processing version of constructionism by way of 
explaining the appearance of modularity. 
10 E.g. see Karmiloff-Smith (1994), Jones (2008) and Tomasello (2019).  
11 Segal (1996) makes an analogous distinction with regards to modularity in general. 
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philosophers of emotion12, but what is missing is an actual explanation of how they can be thus so. 
That is, how can emotions be synchronically encapsulated whilst simultaneously being open to 
various kinds of diachronic updating? The overall aim of this paper is to dissolve our puzzle. But one 
way to do so is to actually answer this question. It is to this task that I turn in the rest of the paper.  
 The picture I provide of emotional plasticity will draw on developmental psychology, 
especially Karmiloff-Smith’s work on cognitive development, which is summed up in Beyond 
Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science. As will become evident, there are 
some non-trivial obstacles that need to be addressed if we are to apply her model of cognitive 
development to explain emotional plasticity. Nevertheless, as I hope to show, these obstacles aren’t 
insurmountable, and her overall developmentalist framework will prove to be a useful tool in fleshing 
out one way we can dissolve our “puzzle”.13 
 
  3. Developmental Modules 
The question we are concerned with is how emotions can be synchronically encapsulated whilst being 
open to various kinds of diachronic updating. At present, there are some gestures towards an answer. 
For instance, Faucher and Tappolet (2008a) explain why a developmentalist model of emotion is a 
promising framework to utilize if we are to explain emotional plasticity. However, they stop short of 
 
12 E.g. see Faucher and Tappolet (2008a), Tappolet (2016), and Majeed (2019). 
13 Note: there are other psychological explanations of cognitive development that might also help 
dissolve our puzzle. For example, both Tomasello (2019) and Dehaene (2020) offer biologically-
constrained accounts of social learning, which prima facie could also be put to the task of explaining 
why (some) emotions look both modular and plastic.  By using Karmiloff-Smith’s framework, I don’t 
mean to rule out such explanations, however, I shall leave the task of exploring them for another time.  
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offering such a model themselves. Likewise, I made some suggestions earlier about possible ways 
emotions might be modular (i.e. synchronically encapsulated) but still subject to cognitive influence 
over time, which draws on context-sensitive modular frameworks from cognitive science (Majeed 
2019).14 Nevertheless, these, I noted, were speculative and underdeveloped. What remains missing, 
then, is a fully worked-out story about precisely how emotions are supposed to be plastic in the 
relevant sense. The present paper aims to make up for this gap in the literature, and does so by picking 
up exactly where Faucher and Tappolet left off. I think a plausible, but by no means only, explanation 
of the relevant features of emotional plasticity can be given by drawing from developmental 
psychology in the way Faucher and Tappolet anticipate. 
 Faucher and Tappolet argue that emotional plasticity is plausibly accommodated by a 
framework based on the Developmental Systems Theory (DST), as championed by Griffiths and Gray 
(1994). On this view, the emotional phenotype is not preprogrammed into our genes, but depends on 
inputs from physiological factors (e.g. locomotion), social factors (e.g. parent reactions), and cultural 
factors (e.g. emotion concepts), as well as inputs from our genes. Moreover, constraints on 
development channel development not in a direction necessarily programmed into the genotype.15 
The DST affords the opportunity for emotional plasticity not present in frameworks that posit 
innately-specified modules, e.g. as made popular by Cosmides and Tooby (2000). However, the DST 
is really a view about biology and it remains unclear, at least from Faucher and Tappolet’s discussion, 
how it is supposed to be adopted in the emotional context to explain both the modular (i.e. 
 
14 I drew on the work of Sperber (2005) and Carruthers (2006), which emphases competition amongst 
modules to explain the context-sensitivity of modular systems. A drawback of this model is that it 
explains cognitive flexibility at the expense of positing more and more modules. 
15 For more on the DST, see Griffiths and Stotz (2000), Griffiths and Gray (2004, 2005), Griffiths 
(2011), and Griffiths and Hochman (2015). 
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synchronically encapsulated) nature of (some) emotions and our ability to diachronically influence 
these emotions over the course of development.16  
 An answer can, nevertheless, be found in the DST. In particular, it can be found in Griffiths 
and Stotz’s (2000) exposition of how the DST can explain an analogous puzzle concerning cognitive 
flexibility:  
 
Taking a developmental perspective on evolved cognitive traits allows us to do justice to 
both bodies of evidence: evidence of the apparent modular nature of cognition and evidence 
of our ability to transcend modularity. The solution of this paradox is to understand 
modularisation as a product of development. (Griffiths & Stotz, 2000, p. 42) 
 
Here Griffiths and Stotz are actually appealing to Karmiloff-Smith’s (1992) idea that if the mind has 
any modular structure at all, it is the outcome of development.17 This picture contrasts dramatically 
 
16 Views similar to the DST that Faucher and Tappolet mention in the emotional context tend to be 
constructionist positions which don’t explain (or explain away) the evidence for the modular nature 
of emotion, e.g. see Russell (2003), or just assume the very thing that needs explaining here (i.e. the 
seemingly synchronically encapsulated nature of emotion juxtaposed with their diachronic plasticity), 
e.g. see de Sousa (1987). 
17 They also appeal to Mithen (1996), who likewise advocates developmental modules. (In fact, the 
idea of a developmental “paradox” comes from Mithen, p. 52). Mithen’s work is instructive but I will 
largely sidestep it on grounds that he’s interested in explaining phylogenic changes in cognitive 
development, as opposed to ontogenic changes, and draws heavily from Karmiloff-Smith herself to 
justify his claims. 
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with the orthodox picture of modules, i.e. innately-specified systems which are incapable of 
undergoing any learning. It is my view that Karmiloff-Smith’s notion of developmental modules 
helps us with our question in two respects. It enables us to explain why emotions can have the 
appearance of being modular, for she can grant that emotional systems can be synchronically 
encapsulated. Moreover, it does so whilst simultaneously offering us a model of modularity that 
doesn’t rule out diachronic updating. What it doesn’t do, however, is provide an explanation of the 
diachronic updating itself. In other words, the notion of developmental modules helps explain part of 
our puzzle, i.e. the appearance of emotional modularity, but it doesn’t explain the other part, namely 
our ability to transcend this modularity. 
 Karmiloff-Smith’s overall goal in Beyond Modularity was to reconcile Fodorian nativism with 
Piaget’s constructivism. In concession to nativists, she grants that the human infant is born not with 
a blank slate but with certain domain-specific dispositions, e.g. dispositions to acquire grammar, 
dispositions to acquire certain kinds of mathematical knowledge, knowledge of physics, and so on.18 
However, in line with constructivists, she also accepts that we are not born with pre-specified 
modules, rather, to the extent that the human mind possess modules, these are acquired through a 
process of modularization.19  
 To clarify, first consider her distinction between domains and modules. A domain is the set 
of representations which sustain a specific area of knowledge, e.g. language, maths etc. A module, 
 
18 In later work, she replaces the notion of domain-specificity with domain-relevance: biases relevant, 
but not specified, to process certain kinds of inputs. E.g. see Karmiloff-Smith (2015). 
19  This theme is developed in subsequent work under the ‘neuroconstructivist’ banner, which 
emphasizes environmental and neurobiological features, as well as genes and cognition, and the 
interaction between these features. E.g. see Karmiloff-Smith (2009), and Karmiloff-Smith et al. 
(2018). 
 
  13 
by contrast, is an information-processing system which encapsulates that knowledge and performs 
computations on it. In this way, the domain specificity of a system doesn’t entail its modularity. On 
her account, we are not born with an innate knowledge of certain domains, e.g. grammar. But we do 
have an innate propensity to acquire knowledge of certain domains, like grammar. Significantly, this 
doesn’t entail the existence of a grammar module. Modules, when they develop (i.e. if they do so at 
all), are the products of a gradual process of “proceduralization” or “modularization”, where 
behavioral responses are rendered more automatic and less accessible. Why believe this? One reason 
is evidence from neural plasticity: “knowing what we do about the brain's plasticity, progressive 
modularization, rather than prespecified modularity, is more plausible. By definition, precoded 
encapsulated modules could not reconfigure themselves. By contrast, modularization is a function of 
multiple levels of environment/organism interactions” (Karmiloff-Smith, 1994, p. 733). If modules 
do form, developmental modules better explain the different ways they can do so through dynamic 
interactions between the agent and their socio-cultural environment. 
 This might not completely convince the nativist, but note that Karmiloff-Smith’s picture also 
heralds a departure from Piaget’s framework in two further respects. First, she rejects his picture of 
early infancy. Not only are we born with certain kinds of domain-specific dispositions, crucially, 
these act as a constraint on development. For her these constraints “potentiate” learning by limiting 
the hypothesis space the child entertains. This has implications for modularity as well. Insofar as our 
minds have modules, the development of our modules is also constrained in this manner. That is, a 
limited set of domain-specific predispositions constrain the classes of inputs the infant mind 
computes, which can gradually lead to the development of brain circuits progressively selected for 
certain domain-specific computations. In some cases, this can result in the formation of (relatively) 
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encapsulated modules.20 Second, she rejects Piaget’s notion of developmental stages and replaces it 
with developmental phases: recurrent cycles of processes that occur again and again during the course 
of development (Karmiloff-Smith, 1987). This enables the developmental of modules even in 
adulthood, which we need if we are to explain automated emotional responses acquired late in life, 
e.g. a fear of dogs developed during middle-age. For Karmiloff-Smith, the central feature of Piaget’s 
framework worth keeping isn’t any specific detail concerning child development, but rather his 
epistemology: the idea that there is more to cognitive development than a genetically-specified 
program.   
 The notion of developmental modules enables us to explain why emotions can have the 
appearance of being modular. Emotions appear modular because sometimes they are modular. 
Emotional modules may form in the course of development, via certain dynamic interactions between 
agents and their environment, which is constrained, but not determined, by their genes. 
Developmental modules also give us a way of explaining interpersonal emotional plasticity. 
Differences in the emotional dispositions across individuals, even concerning their quick and 
automatic emotional responses, can be explained by differences in their developmental setting. The 
development of emotional modules, though constrained by our biology, can be shaped, and reshaped, 
by us and by socio-cultural factors. What remains less clear is if it also explains intrapersonal 
emotional plasticity. Once modules are formed, how do they explain our ability to transcend this 
modularity? The short answer is that they don’t. While the process of modularization explains how 
we can form certain kinds of emotional dispositions, the account is at the same time limited in that it 
doesn’t actually offer an explanation of how we are able to influence and reshape our emotional 
dispositions once we acquire them. For Karmiloff-Smith, such cognitive flexibility is explained by a 
 
20 For more detail, see Karmiloff-Smith (1992, pp. 4-5). A similar account of both ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic development is discussed by Greenfield (1991) and Mithen (1996). 
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distinct, yet complementary process, which she calls “Representation Redescription” (RR): very 
roughly, the process where information stored in a domain gets accessed as manipulable data, which 
enables the application of existing skills to new purposes.  
 
  4. Cognitive Flexibility  
The central idea driving Karmiloff-Smith’s explanation of cognitive flexibility is that such flexibility 
is a product of development. This is manifest in how RR contributes to cognitive flexibility: 
 
The RR model attempts to account for the way in which children’s representations become 
progressively more manipulable and flexible, for the emergence of conscious access to 
knowledge, and for children’s theory building. It involves a cyclical process by which 
information already present in the organism’s independently functioning, special-purpose 
representations, is made progressively available, via redescriptive processes, to other parts of 
the cognitive system. In other words, representation redescription is a process by which 
implicit information in the mind subsequently becomes explicit knowledge to the mind, first 
within a domain and then sometimes across domains. (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, pp. 17-18) 
 
RR is a process where information stored in a domain is redescribed in a way that makes it accessible 
to other domains. This cross-mapping of information across domains enables information previously 
stored in certain domains to be accessed as manipulable data. That is, we not only have explicit 
knowledge of information previously stored in an inaccessible way within a certain domain, but we 
are able to apply this information to solve issues that arise in other domains. Crucially, this provides 
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us with an account of cognitive flexibility because for Karmiloff-Smith, such flexibility, at least in 
one of its iterations, is nothing more than the application of existing skills to new purposes.21 
 Karmiloff-Smith is careful to make a distinction between this model of RR and the process 
by which she thinks RR occurs. The process explains a possible implementation of the model, which 
can be rejected without rejecting the model itself. The more controversial aspects of Karmiloff-
Smith’s notion of RR, arguably, concern the process of RR. On her account, RR is brought about not 
through instability but via behavioral mastery: when there is consistently successful performance in 
a given micro-domain. Such mastery enables a certain kind of meta-cognition, where implicit 
knowledge in the system is made explicit to that system. Meta-cognition in this context becomes 
possible (partly) because the redescribed representations lose a lot of the detail of the original 
representations, which in turn makes them less domain-specific and more easily accessible to other 
domains.22 For example, a redescription of the perceptual information about a zebra into a “striped 
animal” (be it linguistic or image-like) sacrifices a lot of perceptual detail, which makes it less specific 
to the domain of visual perception. But this loss of detail also enables a new form of cognitive 
flexibility, e.g. it allows a human to understand the analogy between an actual zebra and a road sign 
for zebra crossings. 
 The actual process of RR Karmiloff-Smith outlines is more complicated. It involves several 
steps of RR, where each step involves recoding information which is stored in one representational 
code into a different one. For example, a proprioceptive representation can be coded into a spatial 
 
21 Similar assumptions about cognitive flexibility are made by Gardner (1983) and Boden (1990). 
22 How meta-cognition itself is possible is a separate issue, one which Karmiloff-Smith (2015), 
following Dehaene et al. (2014), speculates has to do with a “global workspace”: roughly a temporary 
conscious memory, which maintains relevant information for brief periods and relays it to various 
modules. 
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representation, which in turn can be coded into a linguistic representation, and so on. Each step of 
redescription is an abstraction from the prior representations, which sacrifices specificity for access. 
On her framework, the initial representations involved in behavioral mastery are encoded in 
procedural form, sequentially specified, and encapsulated, i.e. these representations are implicit. At 
the first level of RR, (E1), the representations lose many of the procedurally encoded information, 
are simpler, and less domain-specific. Here information previously embedded in the procedures are 
explicitly defined, including the relationships between their component parts. For Karmiloff-Smith, 
these representations are explicit in the sense that they are now available to the system, though they 
aren't necessarily available to conscious access or verbal report. At the next level of RR, (E2), we get 
representations which are available to conscious access, but these representations are in a similar 
representational code to the E1 representations, and thereby aren’t available for verbal report. (For 
example, we often have access to spatial information, which we can convey by drawing but can’t 
verbalize). At the final level, (E3), representations a recoded into a “cross-system code”, which is 
close enough to natural language, and thereby can easily be translated into communicable forms such 
as verbal report. 
 The exact details of how RR occurs will turn out to be important if we are to use Karmiloff-
Smith’s framework to explain emotional plasticity. But for the present, let us ignore some of the detail 
in order to get a general sense for how the model explains cognitive flexibility. This is best brought 
out by considering one of her examples. When you learn to play a musical instrument, say the piano, 
you first learn a sequence of notes (or chords), which you practice laboriously. In the beginning, you 
are only able to make small changes, e.g. play the piece faster or slower, louder or quieter; there is 
little flexibility. Once this process of playing the sequence of notes becomes proceduralized, and you 
are able to play them without much effort, this kickstarts a process of representation redescription 
where the knowledge of the notes gets accessed as manipulable data. When this starts to happen, you 
are able to do more, e.g. start playing the sequence from the middle, alter the arrangement by adding 
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or subtracting notes, and so on. Gradually, after more practice, and more representation redescription, 
instead of just being able to run off the sequence of notes, you are able to alter things like the 
arrangement, introduce new variations on the theme, add bits from other pieces etc., all of which 
enable a new skill, namely improvisation.23  
 One aspect of this picture that has created confusion is whether RR involves a process of 
demodularization. According to Karmiloff-Smith, the process of modularization is conservative. 
When modules are formed, they remain intact and continue to operate as modules even after RR takes 
place. As she notes, “RR is a process of redescription, not replacement” (1994, p. 733). More 
specifically, RR operates on the outputs of modules instead of their internal functions. (Of course, 
they also operate on the outputs of non-modular parts of the mind). This keeps good on her promise 
that RR is a distinct, yet complementary, process to modularization. In fact, a developmentalist 
picture of human cognition is in need of both processes. We need modules to explain proceduralized 
processes which occur quickly and automatically, processes that occur even in adulthood. Moreover, 
we need RR to explain how it is that proceduralization of certain processes, e.g. playing a certain 
piece of music, lends itself to greater flexibility, say being able to compose a new song using some 
of the skills learnt to play the initial piece.  
 In summary, in this section we’ve seen how a developmentalist framework can be utilized to 
explain cognitive flexibility, and in a way that is compatible with the mind being modular in key 
respects. Some of the details concerning how RR actually works, I suspect, need augmenting24, but 
 
23 For an extended discussion of Karmiloff-Smith’s account of cognitive flexibility, see Mithen 
(1996, Chapter 3). Here Mithen draws parallels between RR and Carey and Spelke's (1994) notion of 
“mapping across domains”. 
24 For instance, many, I suspect, will reject some of Karmiloff-Smith’s levels of redescription, e.g. 
the level where there is conscious access sans the ability to make verbal reports. 
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the general framework gives us a way of understanding our capacity for cognitive flexibility from the 
perspective of developmental psychology, as Karmiloff-Smith intends. What remains unclear is how 
to use this framework to explain emotional plasticity itself. In the next section, I turn to this task. 
 
  5. Emotional Plasticity as Cognitive Flexibility  
Cognitive flexibility, the way Karmiloff-Smith (1992) understands it, is a relatively domain general 
phenomenon, which she demonstrates via its application to specific domains such as language 
acquisition, numerical cognition, musical performance and theory of mind. In this section, I want to 
apply the idea to the domain of emotion. More specifically, my plan is to treat emotional plasticity as 
a type of cognitive flexibility and thereby explain emotional plasticity as we do other forms of 
cognitive flexibility, i.e. via the notion of representation redescription (RR). So how does RR work 
in the context of emotional plasticity?  
In order to apply the RR model to emotional plasticity, we first need to figure out what should 
count as behavioral mastery in the domain of emotion, for it is behavioral mastery in a domain that 
triggers the process of RR. One obvious suggestion is that we should consider emotion regulation: 
[T]he processes by which individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and 
how they experience and express these emotions. Emotion regulatory processes may be automatic or 
controlled, conscious or unconscious, and may have their effects at one or more points in the emotion 
generative process. (Gross, 1998, p. 275)25 
To elaborate, we regulate our emotions either consciously or unconsciously, and we do so via a whole 
host of strategies. These strategies are heterogenous, but they tend to fall into two camps: “antecedent-
focused” approaches that occur before the occurrence of full-blown emotional responses (e.g. 
 
25 Also see Rottenberg and Gross (2007), Gross (2008, 2014), and Zarolia et al. (2015). 
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situation selection and cognitive reappraisal) and “response-focused” approaches that occur after 
those responses are generated (e.g. suppression, breathing and mindfulness) (Gross, 2008, p. 501). 
Emotion regulation is the phenomenon by which we apply such approaches to influence some 
aspect(s) of our emotion. For our purposes, we can understand behavioral mastery as a degree of 
success, or ‘mastery’, in emotion regulation. In practical terms, this amounts to the use of an emotion-
regulation strategy, or strategies, to successfully influence some aspect(s) of our emotion.  
It is worth bearing in mind that “emotion regulation” refers to both short-term and long-term 
regulatory processes. In philosophical speak, this means emotion regulation can involve how we 
employ emotion regulation strategies to influence our occurrent emotions, as well as how we employ 
them to influence our emotional dispositions. Both forms of emotion regulation fall under the rubric 
of ‘intrapersonal emotional plasticity’.26 However, while most work in psychology has focused on 
how we regulate our occurrent emotions, what has attracted the most attention in philosophy is how 
we regulate our emotional dispositions.27 In what follows, I suggest that we regulate our emotional 
dispositions by first learning various emotion regulation strategies to regulate our occurrent emotions. 
I don’t think this idea in itself is very controversial. The real question is about how this works. How 
does regulating particular emotional episodes ultimately lead to the regulation of our emotional 
dispositions?  
 
26 See Section 2.  
27 There is work done in psychology that might prove relevant to long-term emotion regulation, which 
is carried out under the general theme of ‘emotional intelligence’: our ability to monitor our emotions, 
as well as the emotions of others, and to use this information to guide our thinking and actions 
(Salovey & Mayer, 1990; Goleman 1995). See also the related themes of ‘emotional competence’, 
‘emotional awareness’ and ‘emotional differentiation’.  
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My proposal is that a ‘mastery’ of emotion regulation, qua the use of an emotion regulation 
strategy (or strategies) to successfully regulate various occurrent emotional episodes, kickstarts an 
internal process of RR, where certain information that facilitates the performance of this strategy 
become explicit to the agent. Moreover, the explication of this information enables their use as 
manipulable data, which in turn allows the agent to apply this information in new ways. In this case, 
we are able to apply the information to a whole series of emotion-eliciting situations such that the 
subject, in effect, ends up undergoing a change in their emotional disposition. 
 For example, take cognitive reappraisal, the strategy where we reevaluate our emotion-
eliciting situations. Gaining competence in this emotion regulation strategy might make someone 
who is prone to fits of jealousy significantly less so over time. First, they might, with difficulty, learn 
to reappraise specific situations that trigger their jealousy. They might, for instance, reappraise 
instances where their partner is seen to be flirting with a colleague from being threatening to harmless. 
By learning to apply the reappraisal technique in response to this situation, the agent kickstarts a 
reiterative process of RR where the proceduralized information required for this mastery is recoded 
and made available as manipulable data. This allows aspects of this procedure to be applied to other 
situations; initially to similar situations, but then to a whole host of different situations.  
For instance, after learning to reappraise the situation where their partner is seen to be flirting 
with their colleague, the agent might, with more ease, learn to reappraise further situations where 
their partner is seen to be flirting with other people. Moreover, after gaining a level of competence in 
this domain, the agent might learn to reappraise even further situations where their partner causes 
them to be jealous, e.g. when their partner is seen to be neglectful by paying more attention to their 
children. This might, in turn, extend to reappraising situations which don’t involve their partner, e.g. 
when they are jealous because other people are perceived as being neglectful, and so on. In this way, 
we see how a mastery of regulating certain occurrent emotions can kickstart a reiterative process of 
RR, which culminates in the person becoming a less jealous person over time. 
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 It is worth noting that the above picture makes no commitments as to how we are able to 
successfully apply certain regulatory skills to specific sets of occurrent emotions in the first place. 
(Presumably this comes from practice, when the application of certain regulatory skills to a set of 
emotion-eliciting situations itself becomes proceduralized). What it does assume is that once we attain 
a level of competence in regulating certain occurrent emotions in this manner, RR helps explain how 
we can reapply these strategies to other regulatory tasks, such that the regulation of a given emotion 
type, e.g. jealousy, can be reshaped over time. In other words, whilst various emotion regulation 
strategies explain how we can regulate occurrent emotional episodes, RR helps explain how such 
success in regulation can result in changes in our emotional dispositions themselves. 
Let us now address some questions which will hopefully make this picture clearer.28 First, 
what ensures that this entails a change in our emotional dispositions and not just in our emotion 
regulation strategies themselves? To elaborate, in our example, the subject learns to be less jealous 
by mastering certain emotion regulation strategies, e.g. by learning how to reappraise the situations 
that trigger their jealousy. Why should we think that this amounts to a change in our dispositions to 
emote as opposed to a change in our dispositions to regulate our emotions in certain ways? In 
particular, why not think that the change here concerns a change in the non-emotional tendency to 
appraise situations in a way less likely to trigger jealousy?29 
The short answer is that the common usage of the term “emotion regulation” does not respect 
a sharp distinction between having an emotion and regulating that emotion. To elaborate, “emotion 
regulation” is a broad umbrella term that refers to the various ways we influence our emotions. As 
 
28 I am grateful two anonymous referees for this journal for these questions.  
29 An analogous worry might also be raised with regards to response-focused regulation strategies. 
For example, why think acquiring a new disposition to regulate our emotions using a certain breathing 
technique is tantamount to a change in our emotional dispositions themselves? 
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we have seen, we can regulate our emotions using a myriad of antecedent and response focused 
approaches. The successful employment of any such approach to regulate an emotion is typically 
taken to constitute a change in that emotion itself. For instance, consider cognitive reappraisal. 
According to Gross, “Reappraisal” involves changing a situation’s meaning in such a way that there 
is a change in the person’s emotional response to that situation”; and changing the meaning of a 
situation in this way “can profoundly affect the quality (which emotion) as well as the quantity or 
intensity (how much emotion) of the subsequent emotional response” (2008, p. 503). This I gather 
holds true of how we regulate our emotional dispositions as well as our occurrent emotions. In both 
instances, successful emotion regulation is taken to be constitutive of changes to emotion itself.  
The long answer is more complicated, for it must address why using the term “emotion 
regulation” in this manner is justified in the first place. This isn’t something explicitly addressed in 
the literature, but there a few potential reasons. First, any given strategy only counts as an emotion-
regulation strategy if its aim is to regulate emotion. For example, while various situations, e.g. where 
we go, who we see etc., can affect our emotions, “situation selection” qua an emotion regulation 
strategy “refers to the subset of these choices that are taken with a view, at least in part, to the future 
consequences of our actions for our emotional responses” (Gross 2008, p. 501). This gives us some 
conceptual grounds to forge a link between emotion regulation and changes to emotions themselves. 
Second, there is empirical evidence to suggest that emotion regulation strategies involve 
changes to the very systems that generate our emotions. For instance, down regulation is associated 
with a decrease in activity in the subcortical regions involved in emotion generation.30 Relatedly, 
there is also a growing view within psychology that emotion generation and emotion regulation are 
part and parcel of the same process, some going so far as to argue that there is no such thing as 
 
30 E.g. see Levesque et al. (2003), Ochsner et al. (2002) and Ochsner et al. (2004). 
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unregulated emotion.31 If the mechanisms involved in emotion generation and emotion regulation 
overlap in any of these ways, this gives us empirical grounds to suppose that emotion regulation can 
involve changes to emotions themselves. These grounds, as well as the conceptual ones, require more 
scrutiny. But for now, they tell us that the current practice of viewing changes to emotion regulation 
as changes to emotions themselves isn’t without precedence.  
 Let us now consider an altogether difference question, namely how does our picture actually 
explain the plasticity of recalcitrant emotions? Episodes of emotional recalcitrance are occurrent 
emotions that are notoriously difficult to regulate. The strategy I have pursued this far has assumed 
that we change our emotional dispositions by changing our occurrent emotions. The worry is that this 
mightn’t work when recalcitrant emotions are at play. I think there is something to this worry. 
Recalcitrant emotions appear modular. I argued earlier that the modular nature of emotions can be 
explained by developmental modules. Since the development of such modules is a conservative 
process, once modules form, they are difficult to expunge. This accounts for the recalcitrant nature 
of recalcitrant emotions. But we also noted the widely held assumption that even recalcitrant emotions 
are things which can be reshaped over time, at least in some cases. How does this work within a 
modular picture? 
 One suggestion is that we shape our recalcitrant emotional dispositions not by first learning 
to regulate the relevant occurrent recalcitrant emotions but by learning to regulate other occurrent 
emotions, ones that aren’t recalcitrant. Say you have a recalcitrant bout of jealousy whenever your 
partner talks to their attractive colleague. This might not be an emotion you have had much luck 
regulating thus far. Now say you acquired a couple of emotion regulation strategies and learnt to 
apply them to other instances where you are prone to jealousy; instances that aren’t recalcitrant. A 
 
31 See Kappas (2008, 2011), Campos et al. (2004), and Gross and Barrett (2011). 
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mastery of such strategies, especially in the context of jealousy, might activate the various processes 
involved in RR, which in turn might gradually shape not just how you respond to these particular 
instances of jealousy, but to other instances as well, including ones that previously proved 
recalcitrant. Of course, this is not a surefire way to ensure that you will no longer feel jealous when 
your partner talks to their attractive colleague. The important thing, however, is that we now have a 
possible route by which such recalcitrant episodes might be eliminated, if not minimized, over time. 
Two clarifications. First, although this is fairly speculative, it is a natural fallout of our view. 
Cognitive flexibility within a domain is explained by the process of RR, which is triggered via the 
mastery of certain techniques and results in their application to new tasks. In the case of emotion, 
learning to control certain instances of jealousy, using say a few distinct emotion regulation strategies, 
might, via RR, result in the application of these skills to new tasks, such as controlling, with a greater 
degree of success, the instances of jealousy that previously proved recalcitrant.  
 Second, in proposing this explanation, I don’t take myself to be ruling out other ways of 
explaining our ability to exert some influence over our recalcitrant emotions. In fact, ‘emotional 
recalcitrance’, as understood in the philosophy of emotion, is not a very precise notion, and it might 
actually turn out that some explanations work better for some cases of emotional recalcitrance than 
others. For instance, say you are angry at your friend because of a joke they made at your expense 
despite judging that the joke was harmless and that your friend didn’t intend to cause offense. In such 
a case, your anger, arguably, parses the mark for being a recalcitrant emotion because it is an emotion 
that is in tension with your considered judgment. But emotional episodes such as these, though 
initially recalcitrant, are fairly easy to regulate, e.g. by applying techniques such as distraction and 
suppression. In such cases, I don’t think you necessarily need to laboriously learn how to regulate 
other instances of anger before you learn to regulate the instances that prove recalcitrant. You might 
influence them directly.  
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By contrast, consider the paradigm examples of emotional recalcitrance found in the 
literature; fearing your neighbor’s dog and being romantically jealous. These are emotions that are 
supposed to be relatively hard to regulate. Earlier I argued that the we can explain the recalcitrant, 
i.e. mulish, nature of such emotions by employing the notion of developmental modules. Here I argue 
that we can explain our ability to exert some gradual influence over them via the notion of cognitive 
flexibility. In particular, learning to apply various emotion regulation strategies to successfully 
regulate certain non-recalcitrant emotions might kickstart various reiterative processes that represent 
knowledge in new ways, which in turn might, over time, enable us to use such knowledge to exert 
some influence over our recalcitrant emotions as well. Crucially, if these explanations are right, they 
also explain why certain recalcitrant emotional responses, e.g. fearing Fido or being romantically 
jealous, can appear modular on the one hand and plastic on the other.  
 
  7. Conclusion 
The “puzzle” of emotional plasticity concerns making sense of two conflicting bodies of evidence: 
evidence that emotions often appear modular in key respects, and evidence that our emotions also 
often appear to transcend this modularity. In this paper, I have explained how a developmentalist 
approach to cognitive flexibility, which builds on the work of Karmiloff-Smith, can be employed to 
dissolve this “puzzle”. I argued we can explain the modular nature of emotion via Karmiloff-Smith’s 
notion of developmental modules, where functional specialization develops through a process of 
modularization, which is the product of interactions between an individual and their environment. 
Moreover, I also argued we can explain our ability to transcend this modularity in terms of her notion 
of representation redescription, where implicit, domain-specific, procedural knowledge relevant to a 
certain task is recoded into less domain-specific formats and made explicit as manipulable data. I 
don’t take this response itself to have rendered complete a developmentalist picture of emotional 
plasticity. But in proposing this response, I take it we have pushed the philosophy of emotion in the 
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right direction. If we are to understand emotional plasticity, but also its implication for mainstream 
philosophy, e.g. its ramifications for moral theorizing, we should start by taking development 
seriously.  
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